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I. Introduction 
 
The idea of participatory governance has gained enormous popularity in recent times, 
both in academic discourse and actual practice. Analysts have used theoretical constructs 
such as ‘deliberative democracy’ and ‘empowered participatory governance’ to scrutinise 
the scope and limitations of people’s participation in the process of governance.1 At the 
same time, some high-profile examples of successful participatory governance such as 
those of Porto Alegre in Brazil and the states of Kerala and West Bengal in India, and to 
a lesser extent South Africa, have aroused great expectations among activists and 
policymakers all over the world. More generally, the recent emphasis on good 
governance as the foundation for sustained and equitable development has entailed 
widespread interest in participation in the development circle, as effective participation 
by all stakeholders, especially at local levels of government, has come to be viewed as a 
necessary condition for promoting good governance.2 In the developed world too, 
people’s participation in social decision-making processes is increasingly being 
emphasized as a means of combating a range of social malaise, including the problems of 
social exclusion, political apathy and so on. Finally, in post-conflict, post-transition and 
other fragile societies broad-based participation in public affairs is being promoted as a 
means of creating the social capital necessary for building a cohesive society (e.g., Brown 
2006). 
 
A huge burden of expectation is thus being placed on the slender shoulders of 
participation, which almost inevitably has begun to produce a backlash; so much so that 
some have even begun to speak of the ‘tyranny’ of participation (e.g., Cooke and Kothari, 
2001). Yet the fact remains that for all the enthusiasm being shown in its support, 
examples of genuinely effective participation by all the relevant stakeholders, especially 
by the marginalised, socially excluded and disadvantaged groups, is still more of an 
exception than the rule.3 Social action that is necessary to turn the idea of effective 
participation into reality is only beginning to emerge in most parts of the world. No less 
                                                 
1 The idea of deliberative democracy has been explored extensively in a number of recent contributions, 
which include Bohman and Rehg (1997), Elster (1998), Freeman (2000) and Conover et al. (2002). For an 
authoritative account of the notion of Empowered Participatory Governance, see Fung and Wright (2003a). 
2 Mansuri and Rao (2004), Hickey and Mohan (2005) and Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006) contain detailed 
discussion of recent experience. 
3 We define ‘effective’ participation as one in which all the relevant stakeholders take part in decision-
making processes and are also able to influence the decisions in the sense that at the end of the decision-
making process all parties feel that their views and interests have been given due consideration even if they 
are not always able to have their way. 
 2
importantly, much of the analytical work that is necessary to guide that social action – in 
terms of clarifying the relevant conceptual issues and distilling the lessons of experience 
– also remains to be done, even though a good deal of work has already been done. The 
present paper seeks to make a contribution towards this analytical task, by building on the 
work that has been done so far.4 
 
The paper proceeds by clarifying some conceptual issues related to the rationale of 
participation and varieties of its manifestation in Section II. Section III discusses the 
evidence for the claimed benefits of electoral participation at national level, by drawing 
upon the burgeoning literature on democracy and development. Sections IV and V 
examine the evidence on participation at local levels of government, focussing on the 
links between participation and decentralization. Section IV is concerned with the 
efficiency effects of participatory decentralization, while section V is concerned with the 
equity effects. Section VI attempts to draw some lessons for effective participation based 
on the evidence discussed in the preceding sections. This discussion identifies three gaps 
– called the capacity gap, the incentive gap and the power gap – which must be bridged 
by appropriate social action and institution building for effective participation to be 
possible. The paper ends by offering some concluding observations in Section VII, 
drawing particular attention to the need for fostering synergies between the pre-
conditions for effective participation and the practice of participation. 
 
 
II. The Rationale and Varieties of Participation: Some Conceptual Issues 
 
Participation is valued for both intrinsic and instrumental reasons. The intrinsic value 
refers to the idea that the act of participation is valuable in itself, quite apart from any 
value it may have in helping to achieve other good things. Amartya Sen’s forceful 
exposition of the idea of ‘development as freedom’ clearly recognises the intrinsic value 
of participation in the development process (Sen 1999). In this perspective, development 
consists in the expansion of a range of freedoms to do and to be the things that human 
beings have reasons to value, and the freedom to participate meaningfully in public 
affairs is seen as one of those valuable freedoms. 
 
Sen (2002) makes a distinction between the opportunity aspect and the process aspect of 
freedom that is especially relevant in this context. The opportunity aspect refers to the 
freedom to achieve valuable outcomes such as the ability to lead a life free from hunger, 
disease, illiteracy, etc., while the process aspect refers to the manner in which these 
outcomes are achieved – in particular, whether people have the freedom to influence the 
process that leads to the valuable outcomes. Development consists in the expansion of 
both these aspects of freedom because people attach value not just to the final outcomes 
but also to the process through which these outcomes are achieved. 
 
                                                 
4 In particular, the paper draws heavily upon a number of background papers written for the forthcoming 
World Public Sector Report 2007 of the United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs – viz. 
Blair (2007), Commins (2007), Manor (2007), Platteau (2007) and Przeworski (2007). 
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The freedom to participate is related to the process aspect of freedom, and as such it is 
very much a constituent of development, not just a means of achieving it. As a 
constituent it may be valued just as much as the final outcomes. For instance, while 
people value freedom from hunger, they are not indifferent to the process through which 
this outcome is achieved. In particular, they have reason to value a process in which they 
have the freedom to participate actively in the choice of pathways leading to freedom 
from hunger as compared to a process in which this outcome is gifted to them by a 
benevolent dictator. This value of the freedom to participate in the process is distinct 
from and in addition to any value people may attach to the outcomes that may be 
achieved through participation. The intrinsic value of participation derives from the value 
people attach to this process aspect of freedom. 
 
The argument that the freedom to participate in the development process is a valuable 
freedom in its own right has not remained confined to the philosopher’s domain. The 
force of the argument has been recognised, for example, by the international human 
rights discourse, in which the right to participate is enshrined alongside rights to other 
civil-political and socio-economic freedoms. This recognition is quite explicit in the 
Declaration of the Right to Development adopted by the United Nations in 1986, which 
says: “The right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every 
human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to and enjoy 
economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms can be fully realised.” (UN 1986, Paragraph 1 of Article 1; italics 
added) It is evident from this statement that the right to development is to be seen not 
simply as a right to ‘enjoy’ the fruits of development, but also as a right to participate in 
the process of realizing them. 
 
The right to participate is not limited, however, to the context of development. It’s a very 
general right that has a bearing on all spheres of public affairs, and as such it is equally 
applicable to developed as well as developing countries. This is evident from the 
following excerpt from Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights: “Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity … To take part in the 
conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives …” (italics 
added). Thus the universality of the right to participate has been recognized beyond 
dispute, underlining the intrinsic value of participation in all spheres of public life. 
 
It’s a welcome bonus that in addition to being intrinsically valuable participation can also 
be a powerful instrument for achieving a range of valuable outcomes. In particular, 
participation has the potential to achieve more efficient and equitable outcomes in many 
different contexts of decision-making such as allocation of budgetary resources among 
alternative uses, management of common property resources, delivery of community 
services, and so on.  
 
Both allocative and technical efficiency can be enhanced through participation. Crucial to 
the achievement of allocative efficiency is success in ensuring that resources are allocated 
in accordance with the preferences of the people concerned. But ascertaining what the 
preferences are is not a simple task. Market has its own way of eliciting information on 
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preferences (even though it can sometimes go awry), but this can be a seriously tricky 
affair in non-market spheres such as bureaucratic decision-making processes, which may 
have no reliable mechanism for revealing the preferences of those likely to be affected by 
the decisions. Decisions based on wrong perceptions of what people actually want can 
result in wastage of scarce resources i.e., in the loss of allocative efficiency. This is one 
of the pitfalls of top-down bureaucratic decision-making. By contrast, participation by 
relevant stakeholders in the decision-making process may make it easier to achieve 
allocative efficiency by facilitating the process of preference revelation. When people are 
able to exercise their voice in the conduct of public affairs, they will have an opportunity 
to reveal their true preferences. Only participation can allow this exercise of voice.5 
 
Technical efficiency – which refers to the efficiency with which resources are used for a 
given end6 – can also be improved through participation in a number of ways. One of 
them hinges on the notion of informational asymmetry and another on the idea of 
accountability. Informational asymmetry is a common problem in the typical top-down 
procedures of designing and implementation of community-level projects, where those in 
charge of the projects may not possess some relevant information that local people may 
have. Two types of problems can follow from such asymmetric information – known as 
‘hidden information’ and ‘hidden action’ problems respectively. Both of them are 
relevant in the present context.  
 
The ‘hidden information’ problem arises because the bureaucrats and technocrats 
responsible for the projects do not often have access to the details of local-level 
information that may be necessary for proper design and implementation of projects. 
Local people may possess the necessary information, but this information needs to be 
harnessed and used in tandem with the technical knowledge possessed by others if the 
project is to achieve efficient outcomes. Thus in principle the problem of hidden 
information can be solved by a co-operative decision-making framework that involves all 
those who possess relevant information. Participation of local people in the design and 
implementation of community-level projects is essential for this purpose. 
 
Participation can also help deal with the ‘hidden action’ aspect of informational 
asymmetry that often stands in the way of efficient execution of projects. In a top-down 
bureaucratic framework, implementation of local-level projects will typically involve 
local people working for remuneration. If these workers choose to be negligent in their 
duties, this will have an adverse effect on the outcome of the project, but the bureaucrats 
may find it hard to detect the offenders through the arm’s length monitoring methods they 
typically employ. Nor is it always possible to detect negligence ex post by observing 
project outcome, because even if the outcome happens to be poor the bureaucrats may not 
have the information necessary to decide whether it is the workers’ negligence or some 
                                                 
5 As we shall see in Section IV, participation does not guarantee that allocations will be made on the basis 
of true preferences; for various reasons, distortion of preferences can occur even in participatory processes. 
All that is being claimed here is that participation makes allocation based on true preferences more likely 
than would otherwise be the case. 
6 Strictly speaking, this definition is somewhat broader than what economists call technical efficiency as it 
also includes the related but distinct concept of X-efficiency. 
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extraneous factors that are responsible for poor outcome. This is a typical moral hazard 
problem – one that entails loss of efficiency through harmful hidden action. Participation 
of the local community in all stages of project cycle can help circumvent this problem in 
at least two ways. First, the community may employ the method of ‘peer monitoring’ to 
prevent negligence, which has a greater likelihood of success than the arm’s length 
method employed by the bureaucrats. Secondly, the sense of ownership that participation 
can bring may itself act as a deterrent – after all people don’t normally cheat in the tasks 
they consider their own. 
 
The other route through which participation can improve efficiency is by strengthening 
the institutions of accountability. Politicians and government officials who take decisions 
and implement them supposedly for the benefit of the people are often subject to 
pressures that might conflict with the goal of serving the public interest. The more 
accountable they are, however, for their actions, the less likely they are to succumb to 
those pressures and the greater the likelihood of more efficient outcomes.  
 
There are many different ways of ensuring accountability. Some of them are quite formal 
– for example, administrative and judicial procedures for scrutinising the performance of 
government officials and holding periodic elections for politicians. The latter – i.e., the 
holding of periodic elections – is one of the channels through which people can 
participate in accountability procedures. If elective representatives do not perform to the 
satisfaction of the voters, the latter have the option of removing them from office in the 
next election. It is because of this accountability-enforcing property of elections that 
democracy is sometimes claimed to be more conducive to development than its 
alternatives such as autocracy. There are, however, arguments on the other side as well, 
and the relationship between development and the type of government remains a matter 
of lively debate.7 
 
Election in any case is a rather blunt instrument for holding politicians accountable for 
specific actions. This is partly because of the long time lag between successive elections 
and partly because of the fact that elected representatives are expected to perform many 
different tasks some of which they might do rather well while failing in others. Elections 
can, however, be supplemented by other participatory mechanisms with more direct and 
immediate impact on accountability – for example, holding a village meeting in which 
the elected officials are required to explain to the public how they spent the money 
entrusted to them for the benefit of the villagers. As a supplement to the standard 
administrative procedures for ensuring accountability, these participatory mechanisms 
can help strengthen the overall institutional framework for holding the duty-bearers 
accountable for their actions and thereby improve the likelihood of efficient outcomes. 
 
In addition to spurring more efficient use of resources, participation also has the potential 
of improving the likelihood of more equitable outcomes. Efficiency and equity are both 
qualities that are worth aspiring for, but unfortunately in most cases of public policy one 
has to face a trade-off between the two; for instance, while carrying out redistributive 
policies that transfer resources from the rich to the poor, some efficiency may have to be 
                                                 
7 The evidence on the relationship between democracy and development is examined in section III. 
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sacrificed for the sake of equity. In reality, there are not too many policy instruments that 
can improve efficiency and equity at the same time. Fortunately, participation is one of 
those rare instruments than can potentially do so.8 
 
In fact, some of the pathways through which participation can lead to higher efficiency 
are also the ones that can lead to more equitable outcomes. For example, when people 
exercise their voice to reveal their preferences over alternative outcomes and policies to 
achieve them, it not only helps improve allocative efficiency but also creates an 
opportunity for the weaker and marginalised groups of the society to press for their 
interest in a way that is seldom possible in the standard practice of governance. The same 
is true about the pathways that allow participation to strengthen the institutions of 
accountability. While helping to achieve technical efficiency, participatory mechanisms 
of accountability also provide an opportunity to the weaker segments of the society to 
ensure that the duty-bearers cannot get away with policies and practices that are unjust 
and unfair towards them. As a result, when it comes to taking policy decisions with 
distributive consequences, such as how to use the resources at the disposal of the local 
government or how to choose beneficiaries of services to be delivered by the government, 
participatory mechanisms are likely to achieve more equitable outcomes compared to 
non-participatory ones. 
 
The instrumental role of participation can be further clarified by examining its 
relationship with two other concepts – viz., empowerment and social capital. These two 
may be thought of as intermediate variables through which participation promotes 
efficiency and equity. 
 
The causal link between participation and empowerment is quite straightforward. In 
normal processes of governance, in which decisions are taken by an elite coterie 
consisting of politicians, bureaucrats and technocrats, ordinary people are powerless to 
influence the decisions that may have far-reaching consequences for their lives and 
livelihoods. Even if those decisions happen to be favourable to them, the fact remains that 
they are at the mercy of a distant group of decision-makers over whom they have very 
little control. Participation can change all that. The very presence of ordinary people at 
the discussion table will give them some power to influence the decision-making 
processes and their outcomes – even if they are not always able to participate on equal 
terms with the elite decision-makers. One would thus expect participatory mechanisms to 
be more empowering than non-participatory ones, even though the degree of 
empowerment may well vary depending on circumstances. 
 
Participation also has obvious implications for the formation of social capital, which 
consists of the networks of relationships between different individuals and groups 
operating outside the market sphere. Through the very act of bringing people together and 
allowing them to interact with each other in the course of decision-making activities 
outside the market, participatory governance gives people an opportunity to strengthen 
these networks and build new ones. The result is an expansion of social capital – both the 
                                                 
8 Section IV reviews the evidence on the efficiency effect of participation. The equity outcomes of 
participation are examined in section V. 
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‘bonding’ type that ties people from similar social status and the ‘bridging’ type that 
allows people from different stations in life to get closer to each other. 
 
These effects of participation – viz., empowerment and expansion of social capital – can 
in turn have salutary effects on the efficiency and equity of the outcomes that decision-
making processes are meant to achieve. Both of them can enable people to express their 
preference better and to make them count, thereby enhancing allocative efficiency; to 
improve the accountability of those who are responsible for implementing decisions, 
thereby improving technical efficiency; and to ensure that the interests of those suffering 
from marginalisation and social exclusion are not ignored or trampled over, thereby 
promoting the cause of equity. 
 
Of course, it is not guaranteed that participation will always be able to achieve these 
desirable outcomes, and even when it does so the degree of success can vary widely. 
Much will depend on the extent to which participation can actually lead to greater 
empowerment and stronger social capital. But that in turn will depend, among other 
things, on the initial levels of empowerment and social capital with which different social 
groups enter into process of participation. The higher the initial endowments of these two 
entities, the more potent will participation be to engender further empowerment and 
social capital, and thereby to achieve more efficient and equitable outcomes of decision-
making processes. It is indeed arguable that participation can achieve very little in a 
situation where the endowment of empowerment and social capital is practically non-
existent to begin with. One of the concerns of this paper will be to examine the strategies 
and actions that can be help enhance these initial endowments.  
 
The point that needs to be emphasised, however, at this stage is that there exists a 
synergistic relationship between participation on the one hand and empowerment and 
social capital on the other – they can mutually reinforce each other, thereby engendering 
a virtuous cycle.9 An important implication of this point is that there is no need to wait 
for a very high level of empowerment and social capital to emerge before participatory 
governance can be allowed to proceed. All that may be necessary is to cross a critical 
minimum threshold of these two endowments beyond which the synergy mentioned 
above would be able to render participation a self-reinforcing process. This will of course 
have to be supplemented by an appropriate institutional framework for participation so 
that the self-reinforcing process can achieve its full potential.10 
 
The actual practice of participatory governance varies enormously in its form and 
effectiveness, depending on the initial endowments and the quality of the institutions for 
participation. One way of making sense of this diversity is to compare the varieties of 
practice along two dimensions, viz. the scope and the intensity of participation. In terms 
of scope, participation can in principle encompass four distinct types of activities, which 
together might be said to constitute the act of governance – viz. (a) ascertaining people’s 
preferences over alternative social outcomes and alternative processes of achieving those 
                                                 
9 The issue of synergy is discussed more fully in section VII. 
10 Some of the most important classes of actions that are needed to ensure success of participatory 
processes are examined in details in section VI. 
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outcomes, (b) formulation of policies, rules and institutions based on those preferences, 
(c) implementation of the proposed policies, rules and institutions, and (d) monitoring, 
evaluation and ensuring accountability of policy formulation and implementation.11 
Participation can be said to be the most extensive in scope when it occurs in each of these 
phases. Such comprehensive participation is, however, rare in real life; most instances of 
participatory governance cover a subset of the four phases (Blair, 2007).  
 
The scope of participation is not of course an adequate measure of the effectiveness or 
quality of participation, as it also depends on the intensity of participation. In each of the 
four phases, the intensity of participation can vary from the superficial to the deeply 
engaged form of involvement by the relevant stakeholders. The degree of intensity is in 
turn a function of the institutional framework within which participation is embedded. 
The institutional framework embodies the rules of the game that determine, for example, 
who will be allowed to participate in decision-making process, how they will express 
their preferences, how the preferences of different stakeholders will be reconciled, and 
how they will be involved in the processes of implementation, monitoring, evaluation and 
accountability. It is the quality of these institutional details that ultimately determines the 
quality of participation. 
 
Thus although intuitively participation would appear to be a simple idea, its institutional 
manifestation can be quite complex. Its scope can vary widely depending on which of the 
four stages of policy cycle it happens to encompass and its intensity can span a wide 
spectrum depending on the institutional framework that defines the rules of the game for 
participation in each phase. One consequence of this complexity is that participation 
cannot be seen as an ‘all or nothing’ affair – it’s a matter of degree, reflecting variations 
in both scope and intensity. This also means that if the quality of participation in some 
specific instance falls short of whatever one thinks to be the ‘ideal type’, that is not 
necessarily a reason for despair. What matters is whether the existing form and structure 
of participation makes for a quality of participation that is good enough for the purpose at 
hand.12 Once a minimum threshold of quality is ensured, the self-reinforcing property of 
participation discussed earlier can be expected to take over. 
 
Yet another consequence of the complexity mentioned above is that the institutional 
details of participation cannot be expected to be identical everywhere even if the 
immediate objective of participation is the same (for example, providing a particular type 
of service to a community, or deciding on the pattern of resource allocation at the level of 
local government). The same objective may call for different forms of participation in 
different contexts, and this is true in both positive and normative senses. The positive 
sense is that the institutional structure that is most likely to emerge to foster participation 
in a specific context would vary depending, among other things, on the ‘initial 
conditions’ – i.e., the number and quality of the people involved, balance of forces 
                                                 
11 In the context of specific policies, these may be seen as four phases of the policy cycle. See Osmani 
(2002).  
12 This is not an argument for being complacent with the status quo or against trying to improve things 
further, but a reason for not resigning oneself to nihilism at the first sight of imperfection – a point that 
resonates with Merilee Grindle’s idea of ‘good enough governance’ (Grindle, 2004). 
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between different social groups, the overall socio-political environment, the level of 
economic development, and so on. The normative sense is that the structure of 
participation that may be deemed appropriate for a specific purpose may also vary 
depending on these initial conditions. The context-specificity of the structure of 
participation is, therefore, an inescapable fact of life. Any attempt to transfer lessons of 
successful participation from one context to another ought to be conscious of this fact. 
 
 
III. Electoral Participation in National Governance: The Instrumental Value 
 
Participation is expected to achieve many good things, but what is the evidence in this 
regard? One of the problems of assessing the evidence is that participation can occur in 
many different forms and in many different contexts, and its effect can also vary 
accordingly. Making sense of the evidence, after allowing for the contextual differences, 
is therefore not a simple task. Some of the most rigorous analysis of the evidence carried 
out so far relates to the effect of participation as embodied in the nature of political 
regimes that govern the nation states – a body of literature that has come to be known as 
the ‘democracy and development’ debate. The issue in question is whether democracy 
promotes development better than autocracy and the answer is sought by comparing the 
experience of countries with different political regimes. 
 
The relevance of this debate in the present context is that democracy represents a basic 
form of participation by ordinary people in the act of governance, while autocracy 
represents its absence. Any evidence in favour of democracy can, therefore, be adduced 
as evidence in favour of participation. In most democracies, however, people participate 
only indirectly through elected representatives; as such, a democratic political regime 
governing at the national level can be said to embody participation only at a minimum 
level of intensity. Still it is interesting to know whether even this minimalist type of 
participation has any instrumental value in promoting development. If the answer is yes, 
that would provide at least a prima facie case for the view that more intense types of 
participation at national and local levels would promote development even better. 
 
Development of course has many dimensions and it is conceivable that the effect of 
democracy might be different for different dimensions. The dimension that has been 
investigated most extensively is the rate of economic growth, and yet the evidence 
accumulated so far is by no means conclusive.13 During the second half of the twentieth 
century, democracies as a group have enjoyed a slightly faster rate of growth of per capita 
income than autocracies as a group. But even this small difference disappears when one 
controls for the different initial conditions and extraneous influences under which 
different political regimes have operated. Thus on the average democracy does not seem 
to have any edge over autocracy in terms of economic growth. 
                                                 
13 Most of the findings reported in this section are drawn from the comprehensive review of the recent 
literature by Przeworski (2007). For further analysis of the links between democracy and development, see, 
among others, Sirowy and Inkeles (1990), Przeworski and Limongi (1993), Sen (1999, ch 6), Przeworski et 
al. (2000), Tavares and Wacziarg (2001), Varshney (2002), Lee (2003), Keefer and Khemani (2005), Ross 
(2006), Persson and Tabellini (2006) and Sinmazdemir (2006). 
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This result does not necessarily imply, however, that the nature of political regime has no 
causal influence on economic growth. What is more likely is that democracy and 
autocracy have their respective strengths and weaknesses, with each having some positive 
and some negative effects on growth, and that on average the net effects do not differ 
very much. It may be true for example that autocracy uses the coercive state power more 
ruthlessly to depress consumption so as to extract more savings and thereby accumulate 
more capital than democracies can manage to do. On the other hand, it’s possible that 
being more accountable through periodic elections democracies do better in curbing 
growth-retarding rent-seeking activities than autocracies do. On balance these effects 
may cancel each other out. 
 
The average picture also hides the fact that compared to democracies autocracies differ 
more widely amongst themselves in terms of growth performance. The best of the growth 
miracles (e.g., in East Asia) and the worst of the growth disasters (e.g., in sub-Saharan 
Africa) are both to be found almost exclusively in autocracies, while democracies are on 
the whole characterised by middling performances, with the result that on the average the 
two regimes do not seem to perform very differently. 
 
Democracy and autocracy do not seem to differ much in terms of income distribution 
either – the income share of the bottom quintile is found to be similar in the two regimes, 
after controlling for per capita income and other contextual factors. Thus democracy does 
not seem to have an advantage over autocracy in terms of ensuring higher incomes for the 
poorest segment of the population. This is, however, the average picture, encompassing 
both rich and poor nations. Focussing only on the countries at low levels of income, one 
does find a significant difference – the poorest quintile of the population enjoy a higher 
level of income in poor democracies as compared with poor autocracies. As the problem 
of absolute poverty is concentrated mostly in the poorest nations of the world, this 
finding suggests that democracy may have an advantage over autocracy in handling the 
problem of absolute poverty, so long as the countries remain poor. Since as noted above 
the two regimes do not differ much in terms of rates of growth, this advantage 
presumably derives from the greater propensity of democracies to adopt either 
redistributive policies in favour of the poor or more pro-poor growth policies, or a 
combination of the two. 
 
The pro-poor edge of democracy is evident even more when one considers acute 
deprivation, as manifested in the occurrence of famines for example, and dimensions of 
poverty other than income. As Amartya Sen has famously observed, famines never occur 
in independent well-functioning democracies endowed with free media and a vibrant 
political climate that allows for public debate and political opposition.14 As an imminent 
famine looms large, the media, the civil society and the political adversaries begin to 
demand immediate remedial action by the government, which in a democracy the rulers 
can ignore only at their peril in the next election. Two attributes of democracy are at 
work here – viz., the scope for open debate as an accountability-demanding mechanism 
                                                 
14 One of his earliest analyses of the relationship between democracy and famine can be found in Sen 
(1983); the argument is elaborated and illustrated more fully in Dreze and Sen (1989, 1995). 
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and the presence of election as an accountability-enforcing mechanism. The possibilities 
of demanding accountability through a free media and then enforcing it through election 
together ensure that democratic politicians cannot allow famine to reach a stage where it 
would cost a huge number of lives. In the absence of similar mechanisms for demanding 
and enforcing accountability, autocratic regimes can, by contrast, easily let a nascent 
famine get out of control. 
 
This contrast is most strikingly evident in the comparative history of India and China in 
the second half of the twentieth century. Before gaining political independence from the 
British in 1947, India was repeatedly ravaged by famines, the latest being the Great 
Bengal famine of 1944 that cost two to three million lives. Since independence, however, 
democratic India has not endured a single famine, although the threat of famine did 
emerge several times. On every occasion such a threat appeared, the pressure created in 
the arena for public debate was strong enough to spur the government into immediate 
action to avert the famine. This is in sharp contrast to the behaviour of the communist 
rulers of China. They had used their autocratic power to great benefit of the poor Chinese 
by meeting their basic needs in normal times, and yet allowed a temporary food scarcity 
caused by the Great Leap Forward of 1958 to degenerate into the most devastating 
famine of the twentieth century. In the absence of the accountability mechanisms 
afforded by democracy, they faced no compulsion to take remedial measures, and indeed 
were probably not even aware of the magnitude of the problem until it was too late. And 
once they did become aware, their instinctive reaction was to hide the tragedy from the 
rest of the world instead of pursuing all options to save lives, including seeking help from 
outside. The consequence was the tragic loss of close to thirty million lives! The absence 
of democratic accountability has seldom been so expensive in the history of mankind. 
 
The spectacular success of democracy in averting famines is not unfortunately mirrored 
in the fight against chronic but relatively mild hunger, although as noted earlier the 
problem of absolute poverty is probably somewhat less severe in poor democracies as 
compared to poor autocracies. The superior, if unspectacular, performance of democracy 
in dealing with the problem of chronic deprivation in nutrition and healthcare is also 
reflected in better survival chances of the people living in democracies. Cross-country 
evidence shows that democracies in general perform better than autocracies in reducing 
infant mortality rate. This is especially true about the poorer countries of the world. For 
all income levels below $15,000 per capita, democracies have on the average lower infant 
mortality rates than autocracies. Democracy, evidently, can save lives not just in face of 
short term crisis of famine-threats but also in the long haul by lessening chronic 
deprivation in nutrition and healthcare. To put some numbers to the extent of this success, 
it has been estimated that after controlling for other factors that have a bearing on the 
survival chances of infants, democracy makes a difference of 4.6 fewer deaths per 
thousand as compared with autocracies (Navia and Zweifel, 2003). 
 
One obvious problem with this kind of binary comparison between democracy and 
autocracy is that it ignores variations within each type of regime in the degree of 
participation and their consequences. Not all autocracies, for example, are characterised 
by complete absence of participation; some of them do allow periodic elections, even if 
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they are usually non-competitive. On the other hand, democracies, which do allow 
competitive elections, differ amongst each other in terms of the proportion of the 
electorate who actually participate in voting. One of the most interesting findings of 
recent research is that such variations in the degree of participation can matter for the 
well-being of the people. In the countries in which at least half the electorate cast their 
votes, higher rate of electoral participation is associated with both faster growth of per 
capita income and higher share of income for the bottom quintile of the population. These 
result hold after controlling for differences in per capita income, which implies that 
among countries that are at similar levels of per capita income those with higher levels of 
electoral participation suffer from lower levels of absolute poverty.15 
 
Significantly, this relationship between the extent of electoral participation and poverty 
holds regardless of whether or not the elections are competitive, i.e., regardless of 
whether elections are held under democratic or autocratic dispensations. Evidently, even 
though autocrats who allow elections do so without any fear of being forced out of office 
as a result, they tend to adopt more pro-poor policies in response to greater participation 
by the people in the electoral process, as do the democrats. This, along with the evidence 
on pro-poor edge of democratic regimes discussed earlier, suggests that even the 
minimalist type of participation that is embodied in electoral participation at the national 
level can indeed be beneficial for the poor. 
 
 
IV. Participation in Decentralized Governance: The Efficiency Effect 
 
Electing representatives for running the government at the national (or provincial) level is 
an essential part of people’s participation in the conduct of public affairs. It is, however, 
an indirect and infrequent mode of participation. A much more continuous and engaged 
form of participation is possible in running the affairs at community and local levels. 
Both top-down decentralization of administration and bottom-up growth of community 
organizations, often occurring in tandem with each other, can open up such possibilities 
of engaged participation. A growing body of evidence shows that when this happens, 
participatory institutions managing service delivery and common property resources at 
the community level can perform better in terms of both efficiency and equity compared 
to alternative institutions such as market mechanism and bureaucratic management.16 
 
Community participation has been known to have improved the efficiency of irrigation 
systems in many parts of the world by making use of local knowledge on soil conditions, 
water velocity and shifting water courses (e.g., Chambers, 1988; Ascher and Healy, 1990; 
Ostrom, Lam and Lee 1994); of water and sanitation projects, by ensuring that these are 
sited where they are most likely to be used (Manikutty, 1997, 1998); and of public work 
projects, by utilizing local knowledge about safety hazards and vandalism (Adato et al., 
1999). The World Development Report 1994 on infrastructure reported that in a study of 
                                                 
15 For evidence, see the literature reviewed in Przeworski (2007). 
16 Much of the evidence is discussed in Crook and Manor (1998), Manor (1999), Cooke and Kothari 
(2001), Ribot and Larson (2004), Mansuri and Rao (2004), World Bank (2004), Ahmad et al. (2005), 
Hickey and Mohan (2005) and Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006). See also Commins (2007). 
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121 completed rural water supply projects, financed by various agencies, projects with 
high degree of local participation in project selection and design were more likely to 
enjoy good maintenance subsequently than those with more centralized decision-making 
(World Bank, 1994). 
 
Water Aid’s work with communities around Hitosa in Ethiopia is a nice illustration of the 
efficiency-enhancing power of participation. The programme involved thirty-one 
communities that worked together to operate and maintain water tap stands and pipeline, 
with each community providing two representatives for the area Water Management 
Board. The standard of maintenance improved significantly as participation resulted in 
high community motivation, better design of solutions appropriate to community 
resources, and quick response to emerging problems (Silkin, 1999). In the same vein, a 
study of water supply projects in Indonesia, India and Sri Lanka has found that 
community participation in designing and execution of projects led to higher level of 
community satisfaction with the project (Isham and Kähkönen 2002a, 2002b), thus 
confirming the results obtained by Katz and Sara (1997) based on a broader set of 
countries. 
 
Participation can also improve efficiency by ensuring better monitoring and verification. 
The Education Guarantee Scheme (EGS) implemented in the Indian state of Madhya 
Pradesh is a shining example. Madhya Pradesh has long been one of the most backward 
states of India in terms of human development, with the literacy figure being appallingly 
low even by the low standard of all-India average. In recognition of this problem, the 
State Government of Madhya Pradesh introduced in January 1997 the innovative 
Education Guarantee Scheme with a view to ensuring universal access to primary 
education in the shortest possible time. The scheme involved both a guarantee on the part 
of the government and a compact between the government and local communities for 
sharing the cost and managing the programme. 
 
Under the Scheme, the government guaranteed the provision of a trained teacher, her/his 
salaries, training of teacher, teacher-training materials and contingencies to start a school 
within ninety days, wherever there was demand from a community without a primary 
schooling facility within one kilometre and provided this demand came from at least 
twenty five learners in case of tribal areas and forty learners in case of non-tribal areas. 
The community in turn had to identify and put forward a teacher and also provide the 
space for teaching-learning. Local management committees were set up for taking 
responsibility for day-to-day management of schools, and in particular for ensuring 
regular attendance on the part of both teachers and students. By all accounts, the Scheme 
has proved to be an overwhelming success. In the first year of its operation, more than 
forty new schools opened each day, and after eighteen months, the State could boast 
universal access to primary education. A good deal of work remains to be done in terms 
of improving the quality of education offered by these schools, but at least in terms of 
ensuring access to education the Scheme clearly demonstrates the power of the 
participatory approach (GOMP, 1998). 
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The efficiency effect of community participation in the provision of educational services 
is also evident in the Intensive District Approach to Education for All (IDEAL) project in 
Bangladesh. The project has institutionalized participation of the community in two 
crucial stages – viz., school catchment area mapping and school planning. At the 
mapping stage, the community helps in the identification of all primary age children in 
the catchment area, enrolled and otherwise. In the planning stage, the community takes 
part in all decisions related to creating conditions for better enrolment and retention, 
improving the quality of education, mobilizing local resources and allocating available 
resources. The outcome of this participatory approach has been a significant 
improvement in the enrolment and retention of students and in the quality of education 
(Mozumder and Halim, 2006). Similarly, King and Ozler (1998) found in Nicaragua that 
students attending schools under community management achieved better test scores than 
students attending other schools. 
 
Yet another way in which participation can enhance efficiency is by reducing costs and 
by augmenting resources in ways that are not available to outsiders. The cost-saving 
potential is demonstrated by the experience of Social Funds in Malawi. Communities 
operating these Funds were able to convince participants to accept lower wages than 
those officially sanctioned, with the savings being devoted to the construction of 
additional physical assets (Narayan, 1998). The resource-augmenting potential is 
demonstrated by a couple of studies in Nepal and Uganda. Participatory water 
management projects in Nepal have given the incentive to water users to contribute 
generously towards project costs (NSAC, 1998). Nearly three-quarters of the 
beneficiaries contributed cash and/or labour for farmer managed irrigation projects. The 
Ugandan example comes from the Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment Project 
(UPPAP) undertaken in the districts of Kumi and Kapchorwa (Owomugasho et al., 
(1999a, 1999b). The respondents of both districts felt that one of the greatest advantages 
of participatory management was the ease of mobilizing local resources for local use. 
Since people felt confident that locally mobilized resources would be used mainly for the 
benefit of local people, and according to the preferences of local people, they claimed to 
be more inclined to pay taxes to local governments than they otherwise would.  
 
As for participatory management of common property resources by the users themselves, 
there are many examples of such institutions from around the world that have worked 
very well over a long period of time.17 Their existence belies the notion popularized by a 
famous paper by Hardin (1968) that as a result of rapid economic growth and population 
pressure common property resources are inexorably being destroyed all over the world. 
This notion was misleading in an important sense. What is actually inexorable is the 
eventual disappearance of ‘open access’ commons, i.e., those common property resources 
to which access is not regulated one way or the other. But historically, most of the local 
commons (as distinct from global commons, such as the ozone layer) were subject to 
well-defined rules of access and use that evolved over many centuries of trial and error. 
There is no inevitability about the demise of these commons; it all depends on how well 
the age-old institutions can be adapted to the changed circumstances. 
                                                 
17 A small but rich sample of such studies includes McKay and Acheson (1987), Wade (1987), Ostrom 
(1990), Bromley (1992), Knudsen (1995), Baland and Platteau (1996) and Berkes (1998). 
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The possibility of creating and sustaining participatory institutions for managing local 
commons depends of course on the feasibility of co-operation among the users. 
Economists have traditionally been sceptical of the possibility of such co-operation in 
view of the scope of free-riding that is inherent in this situation. But recent advances in 
game theory have convinced them that it is possible for a group of self-interested 
individuals to find free-riding an unattractive option and to spontaneously devise 
institutions for co-operation, when they have to interact with each other repeatedly over a 
long period of time.18 Such institutions are self-enforcing in nature, in the sense that once 
in place their rules are adhered to by the users out of their self-interest – no external 
enforcement is needed. Many of the participatory institutions that exist in the real world 
are of this nature. But there are also other types that are based on mutual enforcement and 
peer monitoring, and still others that are based on hierarchical enforcement i.e., those that 
are enforced by local leaders with the consent of all. In short, there are a variety of 
mechanisms - viz. self-enforcement, peer monitoring, and hierarchical enforcement - 
through which users can in principle overcome the free-rider problem and devise viable 
participatory institutions.19 
 
The important question, however, is whether there is any reason to believe that these 
institutions are more efficient than alternative institutional arrangements, in particular 
bureaucratic management. At least one large-scale study suggests that it can be. In a 
comparison of a large number of community-managed and government-managed 
irrigation institutions in Nepal, the community-managed projects were found to be more 
efficient in terms of a number of criteria - e.g., crop yield, cropping intensity, etc. 
(Ostrom and Gardner, 1993; Ostrom, 1994). The main reason for this difference lay in the 
superior ability of community-managed systems to resolve the tensions surrounding 
allocation of water among different users in the dry season. The study found that a higher 
percentage of community-managed systems were able to get abundant water to both the 
head and the tail of their systems across all the seasons. Since water availability may 
depend on a number of physical factors that have little to do with institutions, Ostrom and 
Gardner (1993) carried out a statistical analysis to isolate the effect of these factors and 
still found community management to be the superior institutional framework. They 
concluded that “farmer-managed systems are more likely to reach bargaining solutions 
about their own operational rules that more effectively take tailender interests into 
account.” (p. 104) 
 
The value of participation for common property resource management is also highlighted 
by the experience of the Indian state of Madhya Pradesh and Nepal. Participatory 
management of forests instituted under the Joint Forest Management Scheme (JFM) 
initiated in the early 1990s has begun to yield hope of halting the age-old process of 
forest depletion. For a long time, the forest people themselves were partly responsible for 
resource depletion as they overexploited the forest resources for their immediate 
                                                 
18 In the game-theory literature this proposition is known as the ‘folk theorem’. The classic exposition can 
be found in Fudenberg and Maskin (1986). 
19 The analytics of these mechanisms for institution-building have been discussed, among others, by 
Ostrom (1990, 1992) and Bardhan (1993). 
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economic gain. JFM has sought to counter this tendency by vesting ownership of forest 
products to the local people so that they can perceive a stake in its long run preservation 
and by actively involving them in forest management. For this purpose, Village Forest 
Committees have been set up for rehabilitation of degraded forests and Forest Protection 
Committees have been set up to protect the well-wooded forests. By all accounts, these 
efforts have begun to have a visible impact on the State’s forest resources (GOMP, 1998). 
 
Something similar has happened in Nepal. In the early 1990s, the government undertook 
a project to hand over forest management to user groups within the framework of 
Community Forestry Projects. The Forest Act of 1993 recognized forest user groups as 
“autonomous and corporate institutions with perpetual succession” with rights to acquire, 
sell or transfer forest products. A large number of user groups soon emerged being 
encouraged by this Act, and in 1995 the Federation of Community Forestry User Groups 
was founded with the purpose of mobilizing and articulating the interest of these groups. 
Evaluations have shown that this participatory approach to resource management has 
been much more successful than earlier top-down approaches in which the Forest 
Department had held supreme power, although the benefits may not have always been 
enjoyed equitably (NESAC, 1998; Agrawal and Gupta 2005). 
 
The preceding analysis suggests that there is no dearth of examples from around the 
world to support the hypothesis that community participation in development processes at 
the local level can improve efficiency in multiple ways. There, is, however, one 
methodological problem that often makes it difficult to draw any firm conclusions. When 
community participation is found to be associated with more efficient outcomes, it may 
not necessarily be right to conclude that participation contributed to higher efficiency, 
even if the association was found to hold after controlling for other possible influences on 
efficiency. The problem is that the observed positive association between participation 
and efficiency may reflect reverse causation – namely, that the communities chose to 
participate only in those cases where the projects were already known to be efficient or at 
least promised to be so. Technically, this is known as the endogeneity problem – 
community participation is said to be endogenous when the decision to participate is 
contingent on the community’s evaluation of the likely outcome. In order to ascertain 
whether participation indeed contributed to efficiency, it is first necessary to know 
whether the problem of endogeneity existed in the particular case under investigation, 
and if it did, to isolate this effect. This is a technically demanding exercise, which is 
theoretically possible to do, but it requires additional information of a kind that do not 
always exist or is very difficult to obtain. 
 
Fortunately, a recent study was able to deal with this problem while analyzing the effects 
of participation in public works programmes in South Africa (Adato et al., 2003).20 Soon 
after South Africa’s democratic transition in 1994, the new government launched a large-
scale public works programme with multiple objectives: viz., to create jobs in response to 
extremely high levels of poverty and unemployment; to build or rehabilitate 
infrastructure in backward areas or to improve the natural environment; to provide job 
                                                 
20 See also Isham et al. (1995) on the question of establishing causality between participation and 
performance. 
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training that would enable workers subsequently to find formal sector employment; and 
finally to build the capacity of communities to control their own development through 
participation in public works projects. Although the projects were executed by 
government agencies with the help of private contractors, the community was involved in 
most of these projects at various stages – e.g., project design, project management and 
hiring of workers. Through careful econometric analysis that isolated the endogeneity 
effect, Adato et al. (2003) have found that participation indeed had an efficiency-
enhancing effect. Higher levels of community participation was found to have a 
statistically significant, positive effect on the share of project budget spent on labour, the 
number of days of work created, the number of training days undertaken, and the 
percentage of employment going to women. It also reduced the cost of creating 
employment and the cost of transferring income to the poor. 
 
Notwithstanding the evidence cited above, it should not be assumed that decentralized 
participation automatically and necessarily enhances efficiency. Participation may 
sometimes be injurious to technical efficiency, if people do not have the capacity to make 
informed judgments on technical matters. Thus, a study in Pakistan found that while 
greater community participation in non-technical decisions was associated with higher 
project outcomes, in technical decisions it actually led to worse outcomes (Khwaja, 
2004). Participation may also harm efficiency by diffusing control and authority in 
management. For example, in a study of water tanks in South India, Mosse (1997) 
observed that the tanks were not necessarily better managed in co-operative frameworks. 
In some areas, at least, management seemed to be better when order and discipline was 
imposed among users by a strong caste authority. 
 
Participation may also fail to achieve allocative efficiency i.e., to allocate resources in 
accordance with true preferences of the people, because there may be circumstances in 
which people, or those who claim to speak for them, have the incentive to distort 
information about preferences. This is especially true of donor-funded projects, in which 
the potential participants may deliberately express preferences which they think are more 
in line with the preferences of the donors rather than of their own, in the hope of 
improving their chance of receiving the fund, but there are also other circumstances in 
which such distortion may happen21 
 
Since these failures of participation occur due to factors that are endogenous to the logic 
of community participation rather than to exogenous forces, these have been described as 
examples of ‘community imperfection’ in analogy with the concepts of market 
imperfection and government imperfection (e.g. Platteau and Abraham, 2002). The 
general point here is that just as both market and government may fail to function 
efficiently due to factors that are endogenous to their workings, so can community. The 
possibility of such community failure should warn us against entertaining the naïve view 
that all problems of governance would be solved simply by involving the community in 
decision-making processes. It is conceivable that some decisions are best taken in a non-
                                                 
21 Platteau (2007) offers an insightful analysis of the causes and consequences, as well as actual instances, 
of such information distortions in participatory activities. 
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participatory manner; and in any case, when communities do get involved certain 
complementary measures may have to be taken for them to function efficiently.22 
 
 
V. Participation in Decentralized Governance: The Equity Effect 
 
It was argued in section III that democracy at the national level is likely to be associated 
with more pro-poor policies compared to autocracies and there is some evidence to 
suggest that this is indeed the case. A similar argument applies at the local level as well. 
If allocative decisions at the local level are taken directly by people themselves or their 
democratically elected representatives, the weaker groups should be better able to 
influence allocations in their favour, compared to the mode of decision-making by 
unaccountable bureaucrats or traditional village elite. The argument rests on the 
presumption that in participatory decision-making processes, even the weaker groups 
would be able to express their preferences and hopefully make them count. 
 
But this presumption may not hold in the presence of community imperfection, which is 
potentially an even more serious problem for equity than it is for efficiency. For 
understandable reasons, there is a great deal of skepticism about whether participation on 
its own can ensure an equitable outcome in an otherwise unequal world. There is also a 
good deal of evidence to support such skepticism. 
 
For example, a recent study of the poverty alleviation effects of the Ecuadorian Social 
Fund found clear signs of unequal outcomes of participation in an unequal society 
(Araujo et al., 2006). The Fund offered a choice between two types of projects – local 
public goods (which were accessible to all) and excludable private goods meant mainly 
for the poor. The most important private good provided was latrines built in plots 
belonging to community members with no previous access to toilet facilities, i.e., 
basically the poor. The choice between the two types of projects was made in a 
participatory manner. Rigorous statistical analysis of these choices showed that, after 
controlling for the effect of poverty, the more unequal communities opted more for local 
public goods than for the private good meant for the poor. Similar instances of mismatch 
between participatory outcomes and the preferences/needs of the weaker groups of the 
communities have been found in the case of the Peruvian Social Fund (Paxson and 
Schady, 2002) and the Jamaican Social Investment Fund (Rao and Ibanez, 2001). 
 
Despite these and other instances of so-called ‘elite capture’ of participatory activities23, 
it would be wrong to suggest that the outcome of participation in unequal societies would 
inevitably be unequal.24 A number of recent experiments in participation at local-level 
governance have attempted to overcome the natural disadvantage of the weaker groups 
                                                 
22 Section VI is concerned with identifying the most important of these measures that are likely to have a 
general applicability. 
23 For more on the phenomenon of ‘elite capture’, see Platteau (2007). 
24 See Molinas (1998) for an empirical investigation of the relationship between inequality and co-operation 
at the community level. 
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with the help of innovative institutional design and supportive social action, and a few of 
them have met with spectacular success.25  
 
Two such experiments have attracted widespread attention – viz. participatory budgeting 
in Porto Alegre in Brazil and participatory planning for local development in the Kerala 
state of India. Though the success of these experiments may be difficult to replicate fully 
elsewhere in view of some special circumstances that have blessed them both26, they still 
offer valuable lessons about the kind of actions that any exercise in participatory 
governance can take and implement to their benefit. For this reason, the workings and 
outcomes of these two projects are discussed at some length below.27 
 
The city of Porto Alegre, the capital of the industrialized and relatively wealthy state of 
Rio Grande do Sul, enjoys high social and economic indicators, with its life expectancy 
(72.6 years) and literacy rates (90 percent) well above the national average. At the same 
time, however, like much of the rest of Brazil, the city represents a highly unequal 
society. Until recently almost a third of its population lived in irregular housing – slums 
and illegal structures – which fanned outward from the city centre, with the poorest 
districts generally the farthest from downtown. The result was a segregated socio-
geographic configuration, generating geographically distinct economic and social zones 
throughout the city. 
 
Within this unequal setting has emerged one of the most successful experiments in 
participatory governance in contemporary world. When an electoral alliance headed by 
the Workers Party (PT) achieved victory in the mayoral elections in 1989, one of its first 
actions was to respond to a longstanding demand of The Union of Neighborhood 
Associations of Porto Alegre (UAMPA) for a participatory structure involving the 
municipal budget. The new city administration developed a set of institutions that 
extended popular control over municipal budget in a way that has by now become a 
classic in participatory budgeting. 
 
The Orçamento Participativo (OP), or the participatory budget, has evolved over the 
years into a highly structured process in which citizens participate as individuals and as 
representatives of civil society groups at different stages of the budgetary process. They 
deliberate and decide on projects for specific districts and on municipal investment 
priorities, and then monitor the outcome of the projects. The process consists of a 
sequence of steps, beginning with regional assemblies in each of the city’s sixteen 
districts, in which all residents of the district are invited to participate. These regional 
meetings have two functions: viz. to elect delegates to represent specific neighborhoods 
in subsequent rounds of deliberations, and to review the previous year’s projects and 
budget. The mayor and staff of the municipal council attend these meetings to reply to 
citizens’ concerns about projects in the district. 
                                                 
25 For a systematic analysis of some of the more important experiments, see Blair (2007). 
26 Heller (2001) offers a perceptive analysis of the commonalities of circumstances that contributed to the 
success of Porto Alegre and Kerala. 
27 We focus on the workings and the outcomes of these experiments in this section; the lessons are 
discussed in the next. 
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In the next step, the delegates elected by regional assemblies join delegates elected by 
neighbourhood associations and other social groups in a series of meetings in each 
district. The objective of these meetings is first to learn about the technical issues 
involved in demanding projects and then to identify and prioritize the district’s needs as 
well as to deliberate on projects that affect the city as a whole. At the end of this process, 
the regional delegates vote to ratify the district’s demands and priorities and elect 
councilors to serve on the Municipal Council of the Budget. These elected councilors in 
conjunction with members of the administration finally reconcile the demands from each 
district with available resources and approve an agreed budget.28 
 
This complex combination of direct and representative democracy has allowed citizen 
participation not only at all stages of the budgetary process – from preference revelation 
to monitoring and verification, it has also given participation a cutting edge by 
strengthening the channels of accountability. In the higher tier of the participatory 
structures, viz. the Municipal Council of the Budget, the district representatives act as 
intermediaries between municipal government and regional activists, bringing the 
demands from districts to central government, and justifying government actions to 
regional activists, while themselves being accountable to the general citizenry through the 
regional assemblies. 
 
There is both qualitative and quantitative evidence that the experiment has succeeded 
singularly to make urban improvements in the lowest-income areas.29 The percentage of 
the public budget available for investment has increased to nearly 20 percent in 1994 
from 2 percent in 1989, while the proportion of municipal expenses in service provision 
to expenses in administration has also improved. On the whole, investment in the poorer 
residential districts of the city has exceeded investment in wealthier areas as a result of 
these public policies. By the end of 2000, almost 98 percent of all residences in the city 
had running water, up from 75 percent in 1988; sewage coverage had risen to 98 percent 
from 46 percent; and the number of functioning public municipal schools had increased 
to 86 from 29. In the years between 1992 and 1995, housing assistance increased 
phenomenally, with the housing department offering housing assistance to 28,862 
families as against just 1,714 families for the comparable period of 1986–88. In all these 
cases, investments have been redistributive in the sense that districts with higher levels of 
poverty have received significantly greater shares of investment. 
 
This redistributive effect has been achieved through a careful institutional innovation that 
was designed to accord higher weight to the poorer districts. Investment allocation is 
guided by a pre-specified weighting system (also called a “budget matrix”), which 
reconciles potentially conflicting preferences of residents from different districts by using 
“statistically measured need” (the degree of previous access in relation to need, e.g., 
proportion of streets unpaved, housing units lacking sanitary water, etc.) and population 
                                                 
28 In addition to preparing the budget, this group amends the scope and rules governing the process itself, 
e.g., increasing the range of activities covered by participatory budgeting, and changing the criteria for 
allocating resources among the districts. 
29 For systematic analysis of the evidence, see Santos (1998), Baicochi (2003) and Koonings (2004). 
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size. The whole system is quite complex and requires a good deal of technical support 
from the municipal executive office to function properly. 
 
This rule-based system of investment allocation, supported by strong accountability 
mechanisms, has successfully replaced the traditional patron-client structure in which 
citizen loyalty went upward and political largesse came downward by a budget system 
based on neighborhood preferences and objective needs. In order to assess whether this 
reflects merely a change from the old type of patronage-based governance to a new one 
in which patronage is lavished on supporters of the ruling party, Baiocchi (2003) looked 
for statistical correlation between the distribution of Workers’ Party’s voting strength and 
geographical investment patterns, but could not find any. 
 
The success of Porto Alegre has been impressive enough to encourage widespread 
emulation all over the world. In Brazil itself, over 100 municipalities as well as several 
states have taken up participatory budgeting practices. Similar experiments have been 
initiated in other Latin American countries such as Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala and 
Mexico, as well as in such diverse countries as Ireland, Mauritius and Indonesia. 
 
In terms of sheer scale and intensity of people’s participation in the development process, 
there is perhaps no parallel to the “People’s Campaign for Decentralized Planning” – or 
just the Campaign, as it has come to be known – launched in the Indian state of Kerala in 
1996. The left-wing government that came to power in that year took full advantage of 
the scope for deep decentralization and an unprecedented level of fiscal devolution that 
was permitted by the constitutional amendments of the preceding years. As much as 35-
40 per cent of the state development budget was devolved to elected local government 
institutions, conditional on the requirement that they must prepare local development 
plans based on extensive participation of the citizens. Every year since then, local 
governments throughout the state of Kerala have formulated and implemented their own 
development plans prepared through participatory democracy.30 
 
As in the case of Porto Alegre, participation take place through a multi-stage process of 
deliberation between elected representatives, local and higher-level government officials, 
civil society experts and activists, and ordinary citizens. The initial deliberation takes 
place in open local assemblies, called grama sabhas, in which participants discuss and 
identify development priorities. These assemblies then form so-called “Development 
seminars”, which are entrusted with the task of developing more elaborate assessments of 
local problems and needs. These assessments form the basis of concrete projects prepared 
by a number of sectoral task forces, which are supported by technical experts. These 
projects are then submitted to local elected bodies (panchayats) that formulate and set 
budgets for local plans, which are presented back to grama sabhas for discussion and 
approval. These approved local plans are then integrated into higher-level plans (blocks 
and districts) during which all projects are scrutinized for technical and fiscal viability. 
 
As a participatory process of local-level planning, the Campaign was guided by two basic 
principles. The first was that instead of serving simply as a conduit of delivering services 
                                                 
30 For authoritative accounts of the Kerala experiment, see Isaac (2000) and Isaac and Heller (2003).  
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on behalf of state and national level governments, local governments should function as 
fully fledged governing institutions with financial and administrative autonomy, based on 
the principle of subsidiarity: i.e., what can best be done and decided at local level should 
be done there. The second principle was that the traditional structures of representative 
democracy should be complemented by more direct forms of democracy, so as to make 
elected representatives continuously rather than just periodically accountable to the 
citizens. A great deal of effort was put into social mobilization and institutional 
innovations so that ordinary citizens could play an active role in the selection, design, and 
implementation of local development plans. 
 
Quite apart from making democracy a more immediate and meaningful experience for the 
ordinary citizens, the Campaign has already begun to bear fruits in terms of furthering the 
cause of equity in Kerala, which was already famous for its welfarist and pro-poor 
policies. The equity impact has in fact improved with the passage of time. In the first 
year, financial devolution was based on a simple per capita formula that did not take 
levels of interregional poverty into account. Even this was an improvement, however, 
over the skewed patterns of patronage-driven allocation of the past (in which the 
relatively underdeveloped northern Kerala was systematically discriminated against). In 
subsequent years, the redistribute effect improved further as the devolution formula has 
progressively incorporated additional weights for poverty and underdevelopment. 
 
Apart from regional distributions, other aspects of resource allocation also bear testimony 
to the redistributive potential of participatory planning. First, compared to the pre-
Campaign experience, the plans prepared in the post-Campaign period have accorded 
much greater priority to basic needs such as housing, drinking water, and sanitation. At 
the same time, the pattern of expenditure on productive sectors has shifted discernibly 
toward activities undertaken mainly by the poor, e.g. animal husbandry, garden crops, 
and minor irrigation. Both these changes have redistributive implications favouring the 
poor. Second, in contrast to past patterns, priorities have been accorded to special plans 
for scheduled castes and tribes, traditionally the most disadvantaged groups in India. 
Although special plans for these communities have existed in Kerala since the mid-
1980s, they received a strong boost after the Campaign was launched. It has been 
estimated that as a result of the Campaign real resources earmarked for these plans have 
increased by 30 to 40 percent (Isaac and Heller, 2003). Furthermore, in the post-
Campaign period local bodies have emphasized projects that could be specifically 
targeted for individual beneficiaries from these communities such as housing, latrines, 
and income-producing animals. Similarly, the Campaign has grappled with the problem 
of entrenched gender discrimination, first by implementing the policy for reservation for 
women in local governments more rigorously than in any other state in India, and 
secondly by laying aside at least 10 per cent of plan outlay for the Women’s Component 
Plan designed specifically to benefit women. 
 
While Porto Alegre and Kerala are special cases, the evidence for participation’s ability 
to enhance equity is not confined to them. Several investigations of the panchayat system 
of decentralized democracy in the rest of India also offer corroborative evidence in this 
regard. In a well-known study, Rosenzweig and Foster (2003) formulated a model built 
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on the idea that democracy would allow the numerical strength of the poorer groups to be 
reflected in favourable outcomes for them. A key prediction of the model is that in 
villages with democratic governance, an increase in the population share of the landless 
should result in outcomes that are more favourable to them – for example, there should be 
more expenditure on road construction or improvements (which are relatively labour-
intensive) and less on public irrigation infrastructure (which benefits the landed 
households more). The prediction was vindicated by the analysis of a panel data set from 
250 villages in rural India. It was found that increases in the population weight of the 
poor enhanced the likelihood of receiving pro-poor projects only in villages with elected 
village councils (panchayats). When more traditional leadership structures prevailed, no 
such effect was observed.  
 
In another attempt to examine how local-level democracy affects the ability of the 
disadvantaged groups to implement their preferred options, Chattopadhyay and Duflo 
(2004) looked at the impact of reservation policy under the panchayat system in India. 
This policy stipulates that one-third of all positions of the chief of the village councils in 
India are to be reserved for women. An interesting question that arises in this context is 
whether participation of women as leaders in community affairs works to the advantage 
of the womenfolk in the community as a whole. Based on a survey in two states of India 
(West Bengal and Rajasthan), the authors found it does. Women were found to be more 
likely to participate in the policymaking process if the leader of their village councils 
happened to be women and women leaders of village councils tended to invest more in 
the kind of infrastructure that conformed better to the interests of women, e.g., drinking 
water, fuel, and roads, etc.31 Similarly, Pande (2003) has shown that when disadvantaged 
groups (lower castes, tribal groups and landless people) in India are able to elect their 
own representatives at the local level where allocation decisions are made, a larger share 
of available governmental resources accrues to them. 
 
These studies suggest that democracy at the local level can be beneficial for the poor and 
other disadvantaged groups, in the same way that democracy at the national level tends to 
be. However, one of the difficulties of rigorously assessing the equity impact of 
participation is that there is seldom any direct evidence on the distribution of costs and 
benefits at the household level. There are only a few studies that have been able to use 
household level information for this purpose. In one of them, Galasso and Ravallion 
(2005) examined the targeting impact of the participatory food-for-education programme 
in Bangladesh. In this programme, funds were allocated by the central government, but 
identification of beneficiary households within a community was typically made by local 
school management committee consisting of parents, teachers, education specialists and 
school donors. Using data from a nationally conducted household survey in 1995-96, the 
                                                 
31 A potential endogeneity problem, analogous to the one discussed in the context of efficiency, also exists 
here. It’s conceivable that women’s leadership is endogenous in the sense that women aim for leadership 
positions only in those communities where they are more likely to participate and to be assertive in 
community affairs. In that case, the positive association between women’s leadership and favourable 
outcomes for women cannot necessarily be attributed to the fact that women happen to be in the position of 
power. However, this kind of endogeneity problem did not arise in the present case as the law requires that 
the village panchayats in which leadership is to be reserved for women are to be chosen on a random basis 
rather than on the basis of community characteristics. 
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study found that poor households received benefit proportionately more than the non-
poor. Moreover, the degree of intra-community equity achieved by participatory targeting 
was found to be higher compared to the inter-community equity achieved by central 
allocation of funds. 
 
In a more recent study, Besley et al. (2005) examined the association between 
participation and equity in the functioning the Panchayat system in India. Under this 
system, village-level elected bodies known as Gram Panchayats have been entrusted with 
wide-ranging responsibilities, including selection of beneficiaries for the distribution of 
the BPL (below poverty line) card, which entitles a household to a number of benefits 
(e.g., subsidized food). The study sought to examine whether the quality of targeting was 
enhanced by regular holding of gram sabha or village meetings, in which village 
community get the opportunity to air their demands and to hold the elected officials to 
account. Using a large data set drawn from four southern states of India, the authors 
concluded that holding of gram sabha did have a significantly positive effect on equity in 
the sense that targeting of the disadvantaged groups was more intensive in villages that 
held the meeting. Thus, illiterate and landless people and individuals from the lowly 
scheduled castes and tribes were more likely to receive the BPL card in villages that held 
the meeting compared to their counterparts in villages that did not. 
 
The evidence is thus quite clear that, contrary to the claims sometimes made, 
participation in unequal societies is not ‘programmed to fail’ to advance the goal of 
equity.32 Nor is success guaranteed, however. Conditions of success must be created by 
conscious design. We now turn to a discussion of what those conditions are and how they 
might be created. 
 
 
VI. The Three-Gap Analysis of Effective Participation 
 
While participation has great potential to be instrumentally valuable in promoting 
efficiency and equity, this potential is not always realized in the real world. Although 
there are some spectacularly successful examples of participatory governance in some 
parts of the world, they are far outnumbered by cases of failed and spurious participation. 
Even the successful cases are not uniform in terms of either the details of institutional 
design or in the degree of scope and intensity of participation. This lack of uniformity is 
often a consequence of contextual differences among participatory experiments, which 
makes it difficult to hold up any particular experiment, however successful, as the ideal 
model. What is important, however, from the point of view of learning from experience is 
that there are certain commonalities that bind the successful cases together and 
distinguish them from the failed ones. Careful analysis of the existing experiments in 
participatory governance suggests that success depends largely on how well a society can 
deal with three distinct but inter-related gaps that stand in the way of effective 
participation. These may be called the capacity gap, the incentive gap and the power gap. 
 
                                                 
32 The characterization of participation as being ‘programmed to fail’ to deliver its lofty goals in an unequal 
society is due to Kumar and Corbridge (2002). 
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The capacity gap arises from the fact that meaningful participation in the process of 
governance requires certain skills which common people, least of all the traditionally 
disadvantaged and marginalized segments of the society, do not typically possess. These 
include such general skills as the capacity to work in a team composed of people from 
different social strata and the ability to articulate one’s views in a manner that would 
hopefully convince others many of whom may view the world through a completely 
different lens, as well as more specific skills related to the tasks for which people are 
participating in a collaborative exercise. Some of these tasks – such as managing a local 
resource or delivering a community service – may be relatively simple and people may 
already have some experience in them. But others, more ambitious ones – such as 
budgeting for the local government or planning for local development – would often 
require a level of knowledge and skill that would be beyond even the educated elite. 
 
This capacity gap must be bridged if participation is to be effective. The general skills 
such as the ability to work in a team and to be able to articulate one’s views rationally can 
only be developed through practice over a long period of time. In the real world, this 
practice typically happens through the intermediation of civil society organizations and 
social movements, which mobilize common people into groups for various purposes. 
This didactic aspect of social mobilization is of enormous importance for laying the 
foundations for participatory activities. It is no coincidence that the most successful 
experiments in participatory governance around the world have all been underpinned by 
years of social mobilization. In most cases, the actual motivation of such mobilizations 
was different from preparing people for the particular participatory experiment that 
followed. They each had their own agenda, but the didactic value of mobilization 
nonetheless acted as a positive externality to the benefit of the subsequent experiment. 
 
As for the specific skills required for addressing the participatory enterprise, there is often 
no substitute for specialized training. What is needed for this purpose is imaginative 
institutional innovation that enables common people to receive knowledge from 
technocrats and experts without, however, being beholden to them. If in the process of 
imparting knowledge the technocrats and experts come to acquire a dominant relationship 
vis-à-vis common people, the whole purpose of participation would be defeated. The 
transfer of knowledge must take place in a setting of fundamental equality and mutual 
respect between the providers and recipients of knowledge. In recognition of this 
imperative, the architects of both Kerala and Port Alegre experiments gave a lot of 
thought to designing institutions that would allow transfer of knowledge in a non-
dominating mode. In particular, they ensured that at the end of the learning process the 
decisions of the common people rather than those of the experts would prevail. 
Institutional design for knowledge transfer was one of the crucial factors behind the 
success of these experiments. 
 
The incentive gap stems from the fact that participation in public affairs is not costless 
and most people would not be keen to participate actively unless they perceive the 
potential gains to be large enough to outweigh the costs. The costs of participation are of 
various types. There is first the opportunity cost of the time and effort that people would 
have to put into participative activities. This cost is especially high for women, who are 
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said to suffer from the ‘triple burden’ of devoting time to the conduct of public affairs in 
addition to the traditional double burden of engaging in productive as well as 
reproductive activities. It is not surprising that women are found to participate 
proportionately less even in the most progressive environment as in Porto Alegre or 
Kerala. There is also the psychic cost of speaking up in public, especially for those who 
are low in self-confidence, and the general hassle of having to deal with matters that 
many people feel officials are being paid to do anyway. Finally, for the subordinate 
groups living in hierarchical societies, there is the probable cost of retribution from the 
dominant classes who may not take kindly to the idea that the lower classes should come 
together to delve into matters that have traditionally been the preserve of social superiors. 
 
In suggesting that people would weigh these costs against potential benefits in deciding 
whether or not to participate, we are not imputing a narrowly utilitarian calculus to them. 
Most people would surely value participation for its own sake, whatever additional value 
they may attach to the tangible instrumental benefits of participation that might accrue to 
them. What is being claimed here, however, is that consideration of this intrinsic value 
alone may not suffice to override the consideration of costs in all cases. In that event, the 
instrumental value will also have to be factored in. The incentive to participate will exist 
only if the totality of intrinsic and instrumental value exceeds the costs of participation in 
the judgment of an individual. This argument implies that in situations where the costs of 
participation are especially high, the instrumental value may well be the decisive factor. 
 
The force of this argument has been recognized both by theorists and successful 
practitioners of participatory governance. In formulating the theoretical construct of 
Empowered Participatory Governance, Fung and Wright (2003) have enunciated three 
general principles, one of which is ‘practical orientation’ i.e., focus on specific, tangible 
problems.33 Underlying this principle is the recognition that participation in the abstract 
may not be a terribly attractive idea. People would be more inclined to participate if they 
focus on a problem they can all identify with as being important for their day-to-day 
lives. Since the solution of a tangible problem will yield tangible benefits, participation is 
more likely to occur when it has a ‘practical orientation’. 
 
When the problem in question relates to allocation of budgetary expenditure as in Porto 
Alegre or formulation of a local development plan as in Kerala, it helps if the resource 
base is large enough so that large tangible benefits can accrue to the participants as an 
outcome of their efforts. It has indeed been suggested that one of the reasons for the 
spectacular success of Porto Alegre is that it happens to be one of the most resourceful 
cities in Brazil. When the same practice of participatory budgeting has been applied to 
other, poorer cities of Brazil and elsewhere, it has not been equally successful. In the case 
of Kerala, it has been argued that a very substantial fiscal devolution at the very outset of 
the process of participatory decentralization has played a key role in its success (Isaac 
and Heller, 2003). Normally, fiscal devolution occurs at a late stage of the 
decentralization process on the grounds that until the structures of administrative 
decentralization are firmly established entrusting local governments with large fiscal 
resources might lead to wastage, mismanagement or out and out corruption. This 
                                                 
33 The other two principles are bottom-up participation and deliberative solution generation. 
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conventional wisdom was stood on its head in Kerala, where the state government 
deliberately transferred unprecedented amount of resources into the coffers of local 
governments up front even before the practice of participatory planning had taken firm 
roots. The intention was clearly to close the incentive gap for the potential participants, 
by raising the expected pay-off from participation though a pre-commitment of large 
fiscal devolution. By all accounts, the device worked wonderfully well. 
 
Of the three gaps mentioned above, the power gap is perhaps the most pernicious of all. It 
arises from systematic asymmetries of power that is inherent in unequal societies. In a 
society where there exists a wide gulf between the rich and the poor, where entrenched 
social hierarchies have led to a rigid demarcation between the elite and the commoners, 
and where age-old norms of discrimination against specific social groups – defined in 
terms of gender, ethnicity, religion, and so on – have long been internalized by the 
oppressors and the oppressed alike, it is very likely that the dominant groups will use 
participation merely as a ruse to further their own ends. Participation in such unequal 
societies is likely to be unequal too, with members of dominant groups wielding superior 
power to further their own narrow interests. 
 
The subordinate groups in these societies suffer from a ‘power gap’ relative to the 
dominant groups, and one way or the other this gap must be closed or at least narrowed 
down substantially if they are to participate on an equal footing. This can only be done by 
creating some countervailing power in favour of the subordinate groups so as to 
compensate for the power gap they otherwise face.34 Theory and practice suggest a 
number of ways in which this countervailing power can be created. 
 
The theory of deliberative democracy, conceived as an approach to collective decision-
making, offers one such way. Any participatory enterprise must follow some rules of 
collective decision-making. And if participation is not to degenerate into a way of simply 
legitimizing the exercise of unequal power by the dominant groups, these rules must 
ensure that the preferences and interests of the weaker segments receive due 
consideration. In other words, the rules must have the property that the very adherence to 
them would afford some countervailing power to the weak and the disadvantaged groups, 
so that their preferences and interests cannot be trumped by those of the dominant groups 
simply by virtue of their superior power. The idea of deliberative democracy is concerned 
with devising such rules of collective decision-making. It seeks to do so by positing the 
power of ‘reason’ as a counterweight to the traditional sources of power. 
 
There are several alternative ways in which collective decisions may be taken in a 
participatory enterprise. One possibility is that the participants come to the table with 
their respective preferences and bargain with each other with a view to achieving the best 
possible outcomes for themselves. Since the distribution of pay-offs of this process would 
depend on the relative bargaining strengths of the parties concerned, this procedure is 
almost certain to be detrimental to the interests of the weaker groups. It might be 
supposed that the alternative procedure of democratic decision-making based on the 
                                                 
34 For an excellent discussion of the need for and forms of countervailing power relevant for participatory 
governance, see Fung and Wright (2003b). 
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majority rule would serve them better, but this is not necessarily so. As is well known 
from the experience of democracy in grossly unequal societies based on patron-client 
relationships, the minority of patrons may easily manipulate the majority of clients by 
using their traditional leverages of power. If for some reason, they cannot manipulate and 
override the majority, the powerful groups at least have the option of ‘exiting’, i.e., 
refusing to participate in the collaboration, which might then jeopardize the whole 
participatory enterprise. So, while democracy is certainly essential, the rules of decision-
making must be such that neither can the weaker groups be easily manipulated nor are the 
powerful groups easily attracted to the option of ‘exit’. The issue of institutional design is 
crucial in this context. As discussed in Section 2, there is no unique formula for 
institutional design that would be applicable under all circumstances – the details of 
design will have to vary depending on the specificity of the context. The objective must 
be the same, however – to ensure a fair and equitable decision-making process. 
 
This is precisely what deliberative democracy seeks to achieve. It requires that the 
participants come to the table not primarily to engage in strategic bargaining, nor merely 
to place their preferences on the table to be aggregated by some mechanical formula 
(such as majority voting), but to present the reasons for the views they hold and for the 
actions they suggest. As Cohen and Rogers (2003, p.241) explain: “Briefly, to deliberate 
means to debate alternatives on the basis of considerations that all take to be relevant; it is 
a matter of offering reasons for alternatives, rather than merely stating a preference for 
one or another, with such preferences then subject to some rule of aggregation or 
submitted to bargaining. The exchange of reasons that a deliberative democracy puts at 
the center of collective decision-making is not to be confused with simple discussion, or 
the revelation and exchange of private information. Any view of intelligent political 
decision-making sees such discussion and exchange as important, if only because of 
initial asymmetries in the possession of relevant information. What is distinctive about a 
deliberative view is that the processing of this information is disciplined by the claims of 
reason – that arguments must be offered on behalf of proposals, and be supported by 
considerations that are acknowledged to provide relevant reasons, even though there may 
be disagreements about the weight and precise content of those considerations.” 
 
It is the requirement of offering a generally acceptable reason for what one proposes that 
acts as a countervailing force against the manipulative and coercive methods that the 
powerful groups might otherwise adopt in order to pursue their narrow self-interest.35 The 
critiques of deliberative democracy have, however, questioned, quite plausibly, whether 
the exchange of reason is potent enough to safeguard the interests of the weaker groups in 
the face of entrenched social inequalities. Some have worried, for example, that the 
emphasis on the articulation of reason implies that the process may work to the advantage 
                                                 
35 Using reason as a force to offset the asymmetry of entrenched power is not the only rationale of 
deliberative democracy, although it is the most relevant one in the present context. Political theorists who 
have expounded the theory of deliberative democracy have done so from several different perspectives. In 
the Aristotelian tradition, reasoned deliberation as a means of reaching collective decisions is seen as an 
intrinsic good. From a consequentialist perspective, Habermas (1987) justifies it as a necessary tool for 
discovering rational laws that will promote justice and the common good, while Rawls (1993) finds it 
necessary for giving legitimacy to political institutions. For an illuminating discussion of alternative 
perspectives, see, among others, Freeman (2000). 
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of the ‘laryingically gifted’, and there is no reason to suppose that the socially 
disadvantaged groups are especially well endowed with this gift. On the contrary, there is 
reason to fear that in a hierarchically divided society people at the bottom rungs would 
not have the confidence and courage to articulate their reasons forcefully in the presence 
of social superiors, even if they had a good understanding of the reasons behind their 
views and were articulate enough to express them in their own way. 
 
While these fears are entirely reasonable on a priori grounds, only empirical evidence 
can show how well grounded they are in reality. In this regard, the experience of the 
actual practice of deliberative democracy is quite encouraging. We have already 
mentioned two classic cases of deliberative democracy in the contemporary world – viz., 
the Porto Alegre experiment in participatory budgeting in Brazil and the Kerala 
experiment in participatory planning in India. In both these cases, citizens at large engage 
in reasoned deliberation – both directly and through elected representatives – at several 
stages in the decision-making process. In both cases, there is ample evidence that the 
traditionally voiceless people have been able in engage in meaningful deliberation, 
undeterred by pre-existing asymmetries of power. 
 
The experience of Port Alegre is described thus by Baiocchi (2003): “There is no 
evidence, however, that lack of education or gender pose insurmountable barriers to 
effective participation … Ethnographic evidence from district-level meetings did not 
show any pattern of women or the less educated speaking less often or conceding 
authority to educated men. A survey question about how often a person spoke at meetings 
painted a similar picture. Responses to the question: “Do you speak at meetings?” 
(Always, almost always, sometimes, never) showed that there was parity between the 
poor and non-poor, and between the less educated and the rest.” Moreover, we have 
already seen that all this was not mere empty talk, because these deliberations led to a 
decisive shift towards redistributive measures in favour of the poor. 
 
The Indian experience of decentralized governance (panchayat) is also instructive in this 
regard. The panchayat system of representative democracy at the local level has existed 
in India for many decades, without being terribly effective, however. It’s only when 
local-level elections were supplemented by the holding of effective village assemblies 
(grama sabha) in states like Kerala and West Bengal that the system began to yield 
benefits for the poor and for disadvantaged social groups such as women, and scheduled 
castes and tribes. The scope for deliberation offered by these village assemblies enabled 
these groups to press their case and to hold the elected officials accountable in a way that 
was not possible before, resulting in a systematic move towards redistributive measures. 
It is significant that in Besley et al’s (2005) study of local governance in the southern 
states of India, policies were found to be more pro-poor in those villages where grama 
sabha was regularly held, compared to villages where it was not, which clearly suggests 
that deliberations in village assemblies empowered the marginalized groups to influence 
decisions in their favour. 
 
It is clear, however, that creating the institutions for deliberative democracy by itself will 
not be enough to generate all the countervailing force that is necessary to make 
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participation effective. Other types of countervailing force must be created at the same 
time to complement the power of reason so that people from all strata of the society can 
deliberate on a more equal footing. 
 
The first and the most basic of these complementary forms of countervailing power 
consists in the self-confidence that comes with education and economic security. Poor 
illiterate people, whose livelihoods are insecure and whose very survival depends on 
maintaining an obsequious humility in the context of patron-client relationships, are not 
very likely to participate independently or assertively in the conduct of public affairs. To 
the extent that they do participate, they will do so mainly to lend their numerical strength 
in support of their patron’s interests. This type of participation will only help reproduce 
existing social inequalities instead of redressing them. If participation is to act as part of a 
transformative process designed to fundamentally alter the balance of power in the 
society, then the poor and the weaker groups must be able to participate in support of 
their own cause, even if it goes against the interests of their patrons. But lack of education 
and economic security prevents them from doing so. Any programme for deepening 
democracy through participatory approaches must, therefore, accompany simultaneous 
efforts to spread basic education and to ensure at least a minimum level of economic 
security so that the weaker groups do not have to fear that independent participation 
might cost them their livelihoods (Osmani, 2001). 
 
A second and broader way of creating complementary countervailing force is to empower 
the poor and the weak by implementing the full range of human rights, including both 
civil-political and socio-economic rights. The fulfillment of basic socio-economic rights 
(such as right to food, right to education, etc.) will create the countervailing force in the 
manner describe above, by giving the weaker groups the self-confidence to assert their 
independence. But this needs to be supplemented by the fulfillment of civil-political 
rights as well because without them assertion of independence in the participatory 
process will be either impossible or pernicious for the weaker groups. 
 
It is obvious that for participatory deliberation to be possible, people at large must enjoy 
the rights to free speech and rights of association and free assembly. At the same time, 
the right to information must be fulfilled so that people can access the information 
necessary for making informed decisions and also for holding the officials (elected or 
otherwise) accountable for their actions. Without relevant information accountability will 
be impossible to achieve, which of course gives the officials every incentive to withhold 
information whenever possible; but without accountability participation will be an 
exercise in futility. It is, therefore, essential to establish the right to information, which 
can be used by the people to pierce the veil of secrecy with which officials tend to shield 
relevant information from the public arena. Finally, people must enjoy the right of equal 
access to justice, so that the weaker groups may protect themselves from any attempt by 
the powerful members of the society to intimidate and victimize them. Without the 
confidence that the justice system of the state machinery can be relied upon for protection 
against vengeful retribution, the weaker segments of the society may not have the 
courage to assert their independence in any participatory enterprise. 
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Finally, countervailing power may be generated through social mobilization. It has not 
escaped attention of careful observers of successful participatory experiments such as 
those of Porto Alegre, South Africa, Kerala and West Bengal that in all these cases the 
ground for effective participation was created by years of social and political activism by 
progressive political parties aimed at mobilizing the weaker segments of the society in a 
wider enterprise in social transformation. Although creation of participatory democracy 
was not necessarily the initial objective of such activism, the act of social mobilization 
that the political parties performed nonetheless created positive externalities in favour of 
the participatory enterprise they eventually embarked upon. 
 
Two such externalities are worthy of note. First, social mobilization helped resolve the 
problem of collective action that stems from the possibility of free riding by self-
interested individuals. It did so by creating and strengthening ‘bonding’ social capital 
among the weaker segments, which in turn engendered the mutual trust and confidence 
that is the foundation of any participatory enterprise.  
 
Second, the act of mobilization endowed the weaker segments with a countervailing 
power against the dominant groups of the society. This was partly the power that comes 
from unity and partly the power that comes from the knowledge of being backed by a 
larger social force. Whatever the source, the consequence of possessing this power was 
that the participatory enterprise that was built on the foundation of previous social 
mobilization was resilient enough not to fall prey to the all-too-common phenomenon of 
‘elite capture’. 
 
 
VII. Concluding Observations: Fostering the Synergies 
 
Creating conditions for effective participation by common people in the conduct of public 
affairs is a complex task. It requires the adoption of a multi-pronged strategy involving 
state, civil society, and the common people. The state in particular must play a very 
important role on a number of fronts – by ensuring free and fair electoral participation for 
governance at the national level; by creating a legal framework that devolves and 
decentralizes decision-making power at local levels, where the scope for direct 
participation by the people is the greatest; by providing basic education, guaranteeing 
minimum economic security and implementing the whole range of human rights so that 
the weaker segments of the society can participate confidently and independently in the 
presence of entrenched asymmetries of power; and by providing the space for civil 
society and social movements to mobilize and educate common people for participatory 
enterprises.36 The existence of strong political will and competent leadership is essential 
for this purpose. The civil society too must play an important role. On the one hand, it 
must engage with the state to ensure that the latter actually does what it needs to do for 
effective participation to be possible, and engage with the common people on the other to 
gain their trust and confidence and to mobilize them into a potent force for participatory 
governance. The common people for their part must be willing to devote the time and 
                                                 
36 Manor (2007) gives a cogent explanation of why government must play the most critical role in 
promoting effective participation. 
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energy needed to take control of the development process in their own hands instead of 
leaving it completely to others. 
 
The inter-relatedness of these multi-dimensional conditions may seem to make the task 
too daunting for the goal of participatory governance to be anything other than an abstract 
utopia. Effective participation cannot occur without committed state support, but given 
the tradition of centralized decision-making processes in most parts of the world state’s 
commitment to diffuse power through people’s participation in governance is unlikely to 
be forthcoming without persistent and overwhelming pressure emanating from civil 
society and social movements; yet civil society and social movements can only function 
if the state creates the enabling conditions for them to operate in the first place. Similar 
cyclicity as opposed to linearity of causal connections exists in other spheres as well. For 
instance, one of the objectives of participation in the development process is to ensure 
efficient and equitable delivery of basic services to all, but it has been argued at the same 
time that the poor are unlikely to be able to participate effectively without prior access to 
basic education and a minimum level of economic security. Similarly, participatory 
governance is expected to empower people and yet is it clear that certain amount of 
empowerment must exist to begin with for the weaker segments of the society not to be 
overwhelmed by the dominant groups in the conduct of deliberative democracy. 
 
This kind of cyclicity of causal connections may at first sight seem like a reason for 
despair, but it need not be. For cyclical causality also implies the existence of synergies – 
between different pre-conditions for effective participation and also between pre-
conditions and practice of participation. Existence of these synergies implies that the 
practice of participation can be self-reinforcing in nature. Once a participatory process is 
set in motion, even if imperfectly, the very practice of participation will help improve 
some of the pre-conditions; the resulting improvement in one set of pre-conditions may 
then induce improvement in others, which turn will enhance the effectiveness of 
participation, thereby unleashing a virtuous cycle.37 
 
Evidence for the existence of these synergies does exist in the real world. In Kerala, for 
instance, the participation of scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and women was below 
their population share in the first year of the Campaign, but the percentages increased in 
subsequent years, as the confidence and the knowledge that came with practice 
emboldened them to come forward more (Isaac and Heller, 2003). Porto Alegre has had a 
similar experience. In the initial years, women and less educated men participated less in 
the various rounds of deliberation compared to educated men, but this difference 
disappeared with accumulation of experience over time. Once the years of experience 
crossed a minimum threshold, there remained no significant difference between men and 
women reporting participation, or between persons with or without formal schooling 
(Bairocchi, 2003). In their study of the targeting performance of the participatory food-
for-education programme in Bangladesh, Galasso and Ravallion (2005) found some 
                                                 
37 Dreze and Sen (2002) make a similar point in the specific context of Indian democracy. After noting that 
many of the deficiencies of India’s democracy stem from its deep-rooted social inequalities, they go on to 
argue that the very practice of democracy would help offset some of the effects of those inequalities, 
thereby rendering democracy a self-reinforcing process. 
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evidence for elite capture in the early years of the programme, in so far as targeting was 
found to be worse in villages with larger land inequality and in remote locations. 
However, targeting improved as the programme expanded, suggesting that the 
programme itself shifted the balance of power in favour of the poor. All this points to the 
existence of a mutually reinforcing relationship between empowerment and the practice 
of participation. 
 
Similar synergy is found between participation and social capital. It is generally 
recognized that the existence of social capital facilitates the emergence and sustainability 
of participatory institutions (e.g., Krishna, 2002). It is equally true, however, that the very 
practice of participation can contribute to the strengthening of social capital. One 
example is the emergence of Neighbourhood Groups in Kerala below the tier of village 
assemblies (grama sabha), which is formally the lowest tier of participatory process 
devised by the Campaign. These new Groups have emerged as the grama sabha turned 
out to be too large and too distant an entity for most people given the dispersed nature of 
habitats in rural Kerala. These Groups have begun to function as mini-grama sabhas that 
discuss local issues and priorities, review plan implementation, and select beneficiaries. 
They have also taken up other activities such as conflict resolution, after school 
educational programs, health clinics, cultural activities and thrift schemes. As Isaac and 
Heller (2003) note, “The crowding-in effect that the Campaign appears to be having on 
associational life in Kerala is also manifest in the proliferation of a variety of self-help 
groups, particularly women’s micro-credit schemes.” 
 
In Porto Alegre, Baiocchi (2003) has noted that as people became deeply involved in 
negotiations and became acquainted with other persons in the district through the process 
of participatory budgeting, they developed lasting bonds with activists from other 
districts and developed solidarities. Through this process, many new associations in civil 
society have emerged, which has added a new zeal and vibrancy to the civil society in 
Porto Alegre. This catalytic effect has been so strong that some have even described the 
Porto Alegre experiment as a ‘school of deliberative democracy’. “Observers of the 
process, such as Gildo Lima, one of the architects of the participatory structures in the 
first administration, argue that civil society has indeed become less locally focussed as a 
result of the PB, and that a new form of mobilization has emerged.” (Baiocchi, 2003). 
 
Another kind of synergy – one between local participation and broader political changes 
– can be seen in places as diverse as Rajasthan (India) and Bolivia. In one of the poorest 
regions in the Indian state of Rajasthan, ordinary rural people engaged in a participatory 
exercise in social auditing to check whether the local government (panchayat) 
expenditures were made according to the plan. The leading actor was a mass-based 
organization called Mazdoor Kishan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS; translated as Movement 
for the Empowerment of Peasants and Workers), which mobilized the common people 
against severe odds as the exercise was going to expose corruption of powerful people. 
One of the main problems MKSS faced in this task was in eliciting relevant information 
from official records, which was necessary to hold the corrupt people accountable on the 
basis of solid evidence. It took nearly seven years to prepare the documentation that made 
a prima facie case that corruption was widespread. This experience inspired MKSS to 
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launch a broader campaign for the fulfillment of people’s right to information. As the 
campaign gathered momentum, other organizations joined forces both within and outside 
Rajasthan, and eventually forced the Indian government to legally recognize the right to 
information.38 
 
Bolivia launched its Popular Participation Law in 1994 mainly to give opportunities for 
democratic participation to the indigenous people whose rights had long been neglected. 
A large-scale reform at administrative and fiscal decentralization allowed these people to 
take part in governance and developmental activities for the first time through a number 
of channels.39 These channels also became avenues for expressing local grievances, and 
as the practice of expressing grievances became widespread it led first to small 
movements, which soon snowballed into larger ones. Thus, local grievances among 
cocoleros (coca growers) in the Chapare region led to a small grassroots party winning 
control of 11 municipalities in the 1995 elections. Evo Morales, an indigenous leader, 
transformed this movement into a nationwide campaign against privatization of water 
provision and energy resource policies, which set in motion a series of political events 
that eventually led Morales to assume office of the Presidency of Bolivia in 1995. As 
Blair (2007) rightly observes: “It would not be too great a stretch to say that the Popular 
Participation Law of 1994, intended to stimulate grassroots participation among a long 
neglected indigenous population, quickly became so successful that an indigenous 
movement gained control of the national government itself.” 
 
These examples of synergy between local-level participation and larger political changes 
help address one worry that is sometimes expressed about the fall-out of excessive 
emphasis on decentralized participation. Questions have been asked whether success in 
community participation at local levels might not jeopardize efforts to make the state 
function better at all levels. There is a fear, for example, that deep engagement of people 
in local level democracy might create apathy towards democracy at the national level, or 
that emphasis on accountability at the local level might weaken accountability 
mechanisms at the national level (sometimes expressed as the trade-off between the short 
route and the long route to accountability40), or that the spirit of collaboration between 
different social strata imbibed by community participation at local levels might sap the 
force of adversarial social movements (such as trade unions) that seek to combat social 
inequalities on a larger scale, and so on. In short, the fear is that success of participation 
in the local arena might create negative externalities for the larger arena. 
 
Examples can be found where one or the other of these fears has indeed come true, but 
the examples of synergy we have discussed above (and many more that we haven’t) 
clearly indicate that there is no inevitability about them. Nor is it a matter of chance 
whether the relationship between local and larger arenas would turn out to be one of 
synergy or of negative externalities. It is the nature of human agency that makes the 
                                                 
38 For perceptive analyses of the Rajasthan movement, see Jenkins and Goetz (1999) and Goetz and Jenkins 
(2001). 
39 See, among others, Blair (2000, 2007) and Grindle (2000) for insightful analyses of the Bolivian 
experience. 
40 On this and other issues related to accountability, see Goetz and Jenkins (2004). 
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difference. Just as the success or failure of participation itself depends on human agency 
– viz., how well various actors like the state, the civil society and the people themselves 
take measures to bridge the capacity gap, the incentive gap and the power gap, the 
relationship between local and larger arenas also depends on human agency – viz., how 
conscientiously these same actors try to foster the potential synergies. It should not come 
as a surprise that the role of human agency should be pre-eminent in determining the 
success or failure of what is after all a social institution. 
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